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Abstract
How does working-time flexibility affect workers’ productivity in a routine job? 
Evidence from a field experiment*
We conducted an experiment in which we hired workers under different types
of contracts to evaluate how flexible working time affects on-the-job productivity in
a routine job. Our approach breaks down the global impact on productivity into
sorting and behavioral effects. We find that all forms of working-time flexibility
reduce the length of workers’ breaks. For part-time work, these positive effects are
globally counterbalanced. Yet arrangements that allow workers to decide when to
start and stop working increase global productivity by as much as 50 percent, 40
percent of which is induced by sorting.
JEL classification: J21, J22, J23, J24, J33
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1 Introduction
Working-time and workplace flexibility p lay a n e ssential role i n p romoting a n ade-
quate work–life balance, especially for working parents (OECD, 2016). They are also key 
instruments for reducing the gender gap in both labour force participation and earnings 
(Bertrand, 2018; Goldin, 2014). Part-time work is an option for employees who want 
to reduce their working time, but it comes at a price – reduced earnings. In 2019, 9.6 
percent of male employment and 25.4 percent of female employment in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was part time.1 Thus 
working part time may reinforce rather than reduce the gender pay gap, although it may 
reduce the gender gap in labour participation rates. Work-schedule flexibility, in which 
workers can determine when to start and finish work each day, does not entail such an 
earning penalty. However, few workers are offered this type of flexibility. I n Europe, 
only about one-third of employees report having some form of control over their work-
ing time; far fewer employees in routine occupations have this option (Eurofound, 2015). 
Working from home is a third flexible a rrangement, which offers flexibility in  working 
time as well as the choice of workplace. Teleworking has boomed during the COVID-19 
pandemic, but it was less widespread before. According to ILO (2020), approximately 
3 percent of employees worldwide worked exclusively from home in 2019. In the US 
and Europe this number is larger (one in five e mployees),2 but in developing countries, 
working from home is less frequent due to lower internet access rates (World-Bank, 
2016).
A key question regarding such flexible working arrangements is why more firms do 
not offer them. If workers value such arrangements, they are willing to work for lower 
wages in exchange for such flexibility.3 A lternatively, w hen k eeping p ay c onstant, the 
option of such autonomy may boost a worker’s productivity either by increasing their 
motivation or stimulating reciprocal behavior (Beckmann et al., 2017). But employers 
may worry that giving workers more freedom will cause them to work less or to re-
duce their level of effort. Some studies have demonstrated a net productivity-enhancing
1OECD (2020), Part-time employment rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/f2ad596c-en (Accessed on 11 Octo-
ber 2020). In Colombia, where our study was conducted, the figures are very s imilar: 9.0 percent for men 
and 26.5 percent for women. They also track closely with the rates from EU28 countries: 8.0 percent for 
men and 26.3 percent for women.
2See the Eurofound (2015) and BLS (2019) reports.
3For recent evidence, see Mas and Pallais (2017), Chen et al. (2019), He et al. (2020), Bustelo et al. (2020), 
and Chen et al. (2020).
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effect of work-schedule and workplace flexibility for non-routine tasks and jobs that re-
quire little coordination through interactions; yet productivity may decline for routine
tasks. However, causal evidence is still scarce, especially with respect to work-schedule
flexibility.4
The findings are more mixed and the causal evidence even more limited for part-
time work.5 Compared to other forms of flexibility, part-time workers could increase
their productivity by suffering from less fatigue than their full-time colleagues or by
allowing the more intensive use of capital. However, high fixed start-up costs imply that
part-time workers may be less productive than their full-time counterparts, because the
latter incur such costs for any number of hours worked. Moreover, part-time workers
may be less committed to their career goals, and the returns on training may be lower
(Garnero, 2016).
This article reports the results of a field experiment we conducted in Bogotá, Colom-
bia’s capital city, to provide causal evidence of the effects on productivity in a routine
temporary job of two of the three flexible working arrangements described above: (1)
working part time and (2) being able to decide when to start and stop working within
the work week. Prior field experiments have focused on the effectiveness of working
from home.6 However, it is impossible to determine whether teleworking affects pro-
ductivity because it provides flexibility regarding the choice of where to work or when
to work. By keeping the location decision fixed and only varying the flexibility with
respect to time, we can obtain more insights into this question.
Flexible work schemes can enhance productivity in two ways. They can either in-
crease the attractiveness of the job such that intrinsically more productive workers self-
select into it, or they incentivize workers to exert more effort or time to working (Beck-
mann, 2016). Our field experiment aims to capture both sources and disentangle the
effect into these components. In order to capture the consequence of self-selection, the
experiment began from the moment the job ads for the three-week positions as data en-
try operators were posted. We advertised the vacancy without reference to the contract
environment. At this stage, applicants were asked to provide standard resume informa-
tion and to perform an online test in which they had to carry out similar data entry tasks
4See Dutcher (2012), Goldin (2014), and for a survey, Beckmann (2016).
5Künn-Nelen et al. (2013) and Garnero et al. (2014) find that productivity is enhanced in pharmacies in
the Netherlands and the Belgian private sector, respectively, while Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013) and
Devicienti et al. (2018) find opposite results for a panel of private firms in Belgium and Italy, respectively.
6See Dutcher (2012), Bloom et al. (2015), Angelici and Profeta (2020).
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as the job to which they were applying. This allowed us to construct an ex ante measure 
of productivity that can disentangle the sorting effects on productivity from the ex post 
motivational effects.
We then randomized the 535 applicants who provided all the required information 
into one of four contract environments: (i) full-time non-flexible schedule – i.e., Monday 
to Friday, 8 AM to 5 PM (reference group), (ii) part-time non-flexible –  i .e., M onday to 
Friday, 8 AM to 12 PM for the morning shift and 1 PM to 5 PM for the afternoon shift;
(iii) full-time flexible –  i .e., 4 0 h ours a  w eek, b ut t he w orker c ould c hoose t heir start 
and finish t imes; a nd ( iv) p art-time fl exible – i. e., 20  ho urs a we ek, an d th e worker 
could choose their start and finish t imes. Applicants were informed of this contractual 
environment, including the exact start and end dates, the location of the workplace, and 
the hourly wage. They were asked to express their motivation for the job by responding 
to a number of open-ended questions. Of the candidates who were still interested, we 
then randomly selected 13 individuals in each contractual environment, i.e. 52 in total, 
and offered them positions. However, since not all of the job offers were accepted and 
because we were constrained by an administrative starting date, we ended up sending 
out 79 job offers; 38 were accepted, and 34 stayed until the end of the contractual period.
Our overall measure of productivity is the number of correct data entries relative 
to the contractual time. Our point estimates suggest that an employer can increase a 
worker’s overall productivity by nearly 50 percent by offering a full-time flexible con-
tract rather than a full-time non-flexible o ne. A bout 4 0 p ercent o f t his overall e ffect is 
attributed to attracting more productive workers. The motivational effect is almost com-
pletely driven by the fact that full-time flexible w orkers t ake f ewer b reaks t han those 
with non-flexible c ontracts. T his r esults i n a  1 0-percentage-point i ncrease i n effective-
ness relative to contractual working time. This is in line with the results of Beckmann 
et al. (2017), who, based on the German Socio-Economic Panel, also finds t hat flexible 
work-time scheduling arrangements increase actual working hours relative to contrac-
tual working hours.
The point estimates suggest that part-time flexible a nd n on-flexible co ntracts can 
also enhance global productivity, but these effects are not significant a t conventional 
levels. However, we do find t hat p art-time w orkers, w ith o r w ithout a  fl exible time 
arrangement, spend 15 percentage points less time in breaks relative to contractual time 
than the reference group, and this effect is highly significant. This does not show up in 
the global effect on productivity, because these part-time workers make more mistakes,
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or are more frequently absent from work.
Our finding t hat working-time fl exibility ca n su bstantially en hance pr oductivity in 
a routine data entry task is new. Prior studies have argued that flexibility i s especially 
valuable in non-routine jobs, but that the impact on productivity in such jobs may be 
negative (Beckmann, 2016). The laboratory experiment set up by Dutcher (2012) has 
been highly influential o n t his v iew. I n t hat s etting, s tudents were r andomly assigned 
to either a “creative” or “dull” task, i.e. a data entry task as in our study. Each of these 
tasks was carried out either inside or outside a laboratory, to represent working from 
home. However, students in this study who executed the task outside the lab were not 
monitored; a major distinguishing feature of our study is that we did monitor workers in 
the flexible working-time arrangement. A further difference is that we hired real workers 
rather than students.
Another contribution to the literature is that our field experiment began during the 
recruitment process; past research has studied workers who are already employed by 
a firm. T his a llows u s t o j ointly e valuate t he t otal p roductivity e ffect o f fl exible work 
arrangements that is induced both by attracting more productive workers and by moti-
vating them to exert more effort. As such, we provide a more complete picture, while 
at the same time propose a methodology that disentangles both components from the 
global effect. Moreover, we further decompose these components to explore through 
which mechanisms productivity is affected.
Our study was conducted in Colombia, which joined the OECD in April 2020. While 
our conclusions are likely to apply to any economy employing similar routine jobs, they 
have particularly strong echoes in emerging economies like Colombia. Indeed, we show 
that working-time flexibility i ncreases p roductivity i n r outine j obs: t his r epresents a 
potentially important source of economic leverage to attract workers out of the informal 
economy, to increase women’s labour force participation (which is typically low), and 
to increase firm p roductivity.7 T his s uggests i nteresting r esearch a venues t o further 
understand how working-time flexibility c an e nhance women’s l abour p articipation in 
economies where formal and informal labour markets coexist.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews
7Labour force participation in Colombia is 50.5 percent in 2020, but with strong gender differences: 
63.1 percent of men and only 28.3 percent of women are employed – one of the lowest figures in OECD 
countries. OECD (2020), Employment rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/1de68a9b-en (Accessed on 11 October 
2020).
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the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design in more detail. Sec-
tion 4 presents the data and associated descriptive statistics, and defines the outcome
variables and their decomposition. In Section 5 we discuss whether flexible working
arrangements attract more productive workers, and in Section 6 we assess how these
arrangements affect on-the-job productivity overall, including both sorting and motiva-
tional effects. In each of these sections we first present the empirical strategy and then
the results. In Section 6 we break down the overall effect to explore the mechanisms at
work, and report the results of our robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our paper contributes to a large literature based on surveys that explore how flexibil-
ity affects firms’ outcomes through the job satisfaction of workers. For example, Kelliher
and Anderson (2010) study the implications of providing working-time and place flex-
ibility on work intensity in large multinational companies in the UK. They found that
flexibility makes workers more satisfied and more committed to their employers, and
therefore they work more intensively. The authors argue that this is induced by recipro-
cal behavior. In other words, workers exert more effort “in order to return the benefit to
their employer.” These findings are very similar to those of Eaton (2003) for US firms.
However, this literature generally reveals associations rather than causal effects.
Beckmann et al. (2017) use a similar definition of work schedule flexibility as ours,
and study the effect of self-managed working time on the level of effort that workers
exert in their job. They first developed a modified moral-hazard model that shows how
working-time autonomy can decrease or increase effort depending on whether extrin-
sic or intrinsic worker motivation dominates.8 Then they used data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel to test the empirical prediction of this model, paying particular at-
tention to identifying causal effects. They find that working-time autonomy increases the
total hours worked and decreases absenteeism. However, they did not directly measure
productivity, as we do in our study.
Closely related to our work, two recent field experiments evaluated the effects of
workplace flexibility on workers’ productivity.9 Bloom et al. (2015) carried out a field
8The authors consider reciprocal behavior as an alternative driver of effort, but their empirical evidence
suggests that this factor is less important than intrinsic motivation.
9A third highly relevant field experiment is the one conducted by Dutcher (2012), which we discussed
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experiment with Chinese call center employees who were asked if they would be in-
terested in working from home. Among those interested, the call center randomly of-
fered positions working from home for a 9-month period. The study finds that working 
from home increased self-reported satisfaction levels and raised productivity by about 
13 percent, 9 percent of which was due to working longer hours than in the office and 
4 percent of which resulted from making more telephone calls per hour. The authors 
also studied the effects of sorting and found that teleworking could further enhance the 
productivity gains to 22 percent. This study is similar to ours in that they also measured 
productivity in terms of output per time and the job tasks did not require any specific 
skills or coordination.10 However, Bloom’s study differs from ours in at least three re-
spects. First, they define flexibility by  place rather than by  ti me. Second, they focus on 
a group of self-selected employees who expressed an interest in that type of flexibility, 
while we randomly assigned flexibility to job a pplicants. Moreover, they measured the 
impact of sorting by offering participants in the initial experimental group to re-select 
between working at home and at the office, w hich i s d ifferent ( and a rguably l ess rele-
vant) than measuring this during the recruitment process as we do. Third, the salary 
of workers in the call center was not fixed, a s i t was i n o ur s tudy. I t varied according 
to workers’ performance and may have interacted with the flexibility arrangement in its 
productivity-enhancing effect.
In a second closely related experiment, Angelici and Profeta (2020) randomly offered 
a “smart work" alternative to a sample of over 300 workers from an Italian multi-utility 
sector firm, and measured the effect on productivity, well-being, and work–life balance. 
Workers had the opportunity to choose the time and place of work (outside the office) 
one day a week during a 9-month period. Their experiment used different measures 
of productivity (self-reported and objective) as well as self-reported measures of well-
being and work–life balance. It finds that promoting smart working is an effective way 
to increase productivity, and to improve well-being and work–life balance. Their study 
differs from ours in three important ways. First, it only considers workplace flexibility. 
Second, it evaluates a heterogeneous group of blue- and white-collar workers with vari-
ous responsibilities, which prevented them from defining a precise productivity measure 
and from linking effectiveness to the nature of the jobholders’ tasks. Third, they did not
in the Introduction.
10Nevertheless, the telephone calls may not have been as routine as the data entry tasks in our study or 
that of Dutcher (2012), which may partly explain why they did not find negative effects on productivity 
as in Dutcher’s study.
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assess the impact of sorting on productivity.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted a field e xperiment i n w hich w e p osted r eal j ob a ds f or d ata entry 
clerks to observe job applicants’ choices and performance in a natural environment. 
We generated random variation across job seekers in invitations to apply for jobs that 
differed in two dimensions of job schedule flexibility: working time (full time versus part 
time) and, for any given working time, the autonomy to schedule when to accomplish 
this work within the workweek. This resulted in randomizing job seekers into one of 
four contract environments: non-flexible f ull t ime, fl exible fu ll ti me, no n-flexible part 
time, and flexible part time.
The experiment was designed to measure the effect of job schedule flexibility on 
productivity. This flexibility can affect productivity in two w ays. First, inherently more 
productive workers may be more likely to accept jobs that provide the flexibility they 
prefer. Second, conditional on being hired, workers may allocate more effort and/or 
conscientiousness to the job. In this experiment we aim to measure the combined effect 
of this ex ante sorting and ex post motivationally induced behavioral reaction to flexibility 
on workers’ productivity. To capture this combined effect, we advertised the position 
without referring to the contract environment and then randomly offered applicants one 
of the four arrangements described above. After imposing certain prerequisites (doing 
a pre-test, confirming i nterest i n t he c ontract t ype, a nd r esponses t o o pen questions) 
designed to mimic the recruitment selection process, a random sample of remaining 
candidates was offered the position. The workers who accepted the position were hired 
for a period of 3 weeks. Their on-the-job productivity was measured throughout this 
time.
We also seek to disentangle the ex ante sorting effects from the ex post behavioural 
effects of job flexibility o n p roductivity. B efore t he c ontract t ype was r evealed, j ob ap-
plicants were asked to provide a resume and to take an online test that measured their 
productivity in similar tasks as the ones required in the job they applied for. This ex ante 
measure allows us to determine (i) to what extent more productive individuals self-select 
into more flexible work arrangements and (ii) to what extent, conditional on this ex ante 
measure of productivity, more flexible work arrangements enhance the ex post produc-
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tivity performance between contract types. In the next two subsections, we describe the
different steps in the hiring process and working environment, respectively.
3.1 Steps of the hiring process
Step 1: The job ad
We placed real job advertisements for data entry clerks every week for a month in dif-
ferent standard job postings in Bogota (internet and newspaper). The job offer involved
real employment for a task that did not require a specific level of education or special-
ized skills. We advertised the position without referring to the type of contract, and
asked job seekers to fill out an online CV form, which included an online productivity
test. The posted job ad was phrased as follows:
Job Advertisement Title: Prestigious university needs data clerks to
support a research project.
Description: Contract for the provision of services.
Duration: Three weeks.
If you are interested in this offer, apply via the following link: LINK,
or send us a message via Whats-App.
Step 2: Collecting resume information and the productivity test
The online CV form included standard questions about the applicants’ level of ed-
ucation, labor market experience, and other demographic characteristics (see Appendix
8.1 for the complete questionnaire). After filling out the form, applicants were invited
to complete the online test to measure their ex ante productivity levels.11 Those who
started the application but did not finish the online test were not considered in the next
stages of the application process and were dropped from the experiment. The test con-
sisted of executing three tasks that resembled those required in the job to which the job
seeker applied.12 Based on the answers to this test, we constructed the following ex ante
11The tests were timed, but job applicants did not know this.
12Appendix 8.2 describes the test.
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productivity measure for each individual, i, and each task, T:
ProdiT =
Correct AnswersiT
Total QuestionsiT
× 1
TimeiT
An applicant was classified as a highly productive worker if she scored higher than the
median in all three tests:
Highi = 1[Prodi1  Med(Prodi1)&Prodi2  Med(Prodi2)&Prodi3  Med(Prodi3)] (1)
where 1[A] = 1 if A is true, and 1[A] = 0 if A is false.
Step 3: Random assignment of contract types
Respondents who completed the required resume information and the productivity
test were provided with more details about the contractual terms of the job: the period
and place of employment, wage, and working-time regime.13 The first three contractual
terms were fixed: 3 weeks of employment between November 26 and December 14, 2018
in the computer labs of the university,14 remunerated at a gross hourly wage of 7.000
Colombian Pesos (COP), which is about 2.33 USD.15 The dimensions that varied across
contract types were the four working-time regimes: non-flexible full time, flexible full
time, non-flexible part time, and flexible part time.
The full-time contract required working 40 hours a week, and the part-time contract
was for 20 hours. In a fixed working-time schedule the full-time worker had to work
Monday to Friday, 8 AM to 5 PM with a one-hour lunch break from noon to 1 PM.
Part-time workers were randomly assigned to work either in the morning (from 8 AM
to 12 PM) or the afternoon (from 1 PM to 5 PM). In a flexible working-time schedule
the worker could freely determine their working hours within the opening hours of the
computer lab, i.e. Monday to Friday, 8 AM to 8 PM.
We stratified the sample before randomizing them to one of the four treatment con-
ditions for two reasons. First, in order to enhance the precision of the estimates of the
13Appendix 8.3 presents the phrasing of this e-mail.
14We did not offer the possibility of teleworking. The email stated that the work had to be performed
at Javeriana University in Bogota.
15This salary corresponds to approximately 1.3 times the minimum wage or 74 percent of the average
wage in Colombia. The salary was was based on the regular salary of a data clerk.
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treatment effects, we stratified the respondents according to an attribute, ex ante produc-
tivity, that we expect to be a good predictor of the potential outcome, ex post productivity 
(Imbens and Rubin, 2015). We created a dichotomous stratification variable t hat splits 
the sample into high or low ex ante productivity as defined i n e quation ( 1) i n s tep 1. 
The second reason is that since contractual flexibility is particularly relevant for women 
in general and caregivers in particular (defined b y t he p resence i n t he h ousehold of 
children under 5 years of age, a disabled person or an adult over 65 years old with per-
manent care needs), we also stratified the sample along these two dimensions to allow 
us to study the heterogeneity of the impact of flexibility i n t hese d imensions.16 This 
resulted in eight stratification c ells d efined by  al l po ssible co mbinations of  th ese three 
stratification variables.
Steps 4 and 5: Mimicking the recruitment selection process
At the end of the e-mail containing the detailed contractual information, applicants 
were asked whether they were still interested in the job. Those who responded affirma-
tively and those who did not respond received another e-mail designed to reduce the 
number of candidates for the position, as a recruitment exam and/or interview would 
do in a standard job application. This e-mail (see Appendix 8.4 for more details) inquired 
about applicants’ motivation and asked a number of informative open-ended questions 
in an attempt to retain only the most motivated candidates.
In a fourth step, job offers were sent to applicants who reacted positively to this 
last e-mail according to a second stratified random sampling scheme based on the same 
stratification a s t he fi rst ra ndom as signment. Fo r th is pu rpose, of  th e re taining candi-
dates, 13 individuals were randomly selected from each contract type, so 52 (= 13 x 
4) job offers were sent out. However, not all of these offers were accepted, likely due 
to the standard additional administrative requests involved, such as the provision of a 
tax identification n umber, a n i dentification do cument, a ce rtificate of affi liation with  a 
health service, and a declaration that one is willing to pay the mandatory social security 
contributions (see Appendix 8.5 for more details). Consequently, we had to send out ad-
ditional job offers. Because we were constrained by the announced starting date of the 
employment contract, we did not manage to hire the intended 13 workers in any of the 
four contract types. Eventually, after offering a job to 78 applicants, we only managed to
16However, as mentioned in the next subsection, since fewer individuals were hired than expected, the 
small sample size did not allow such heterogeneity analysis.
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hire 38 workers; four of these quit shortly after the contract started. Section 4 provides 
additional descriptive evidence.
3.2 The work environment
The workers were hired to perform a data entry task in the computer labs at Univer-
sidad Javeriana in Bogota. We assigned a separate lab to each treatment group, located 
in different buildings, to reduce the risk of communication between individuals from 
different treatment groups. We hired eight undergraduate students who monitored each 
computer lab during the entire experiment. Monitors were randomly assigned to one of 
the four rooms in two shifts (morning from 8 AM to 2 PM, and afternoon from 2 PM 
to 8 PM), and were rotated across all rooms to avoid creating habits with monitors and 
thus minimize monitor-specific effects. Monitors were present at the computer lab all the 
time and had to register any activity that happened in the computer rooms during their 
shifts. They were also asked to report each worker’s time of arrival and departure every 
working day, and to assist workers with any technical difficulties. Additionally, they had 
to ensure that the computer labs were open on time every day. Monitors could not leave 
the rooms until everyone had left. On the first working day the monitors instructed the 
workers on how to use the software and all the details of the working schedule. The 
workers then started with their data entry tasks.
An ID code was assigned to each worker, together with a user name and password 
to log into the software created for the data entry process. The software displayed the 
image in a dialog box (chart or typing space), recorded the answer, the time spent on 
each image, the breaks reported by the worker, and the time she completed her tasks 
for the day. This software was created in Python and depicted images of characters 
(numbers) from a Chilean Agrarian Census with 350,000 images.17
Each image was randomly assigned with equal probability to approximately nine 
workers to determine the correct data entries, but on average all the images from the 
Census were typed at least seven times, because not all workers typed at the same 
speed and therefore did not type all the planned images. The following figure shows an 
example of what was displayed on the screen:
17The data entries were used for a research project of professor Nicolas Lillo from the Economics De-
partment at Universidad Javeriana.
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Figure 1. Task Sample
4 Data and descriptive statistics
This section describes the size of the different samples – from the pool of applicants 
to the final group of hired workers in our experiment –  and the main variables used in 
the different steps of our analysis.
4.1 Selection process in the pool of applicants
Table 1 summarizes how the sample size decreased at each stage of the experiment. 
We received 686 job applications to the job ad. Only the 535 individuals who completed 
the three productivity tests were retained for the next steps in the application process. 
As mentioned above, individuals within each of the eight strata – gender, high/low 
ex ante productivity, caregiver status – were then randomly assigned to four different 
treatments: T1 – full-time non-flexible (control group), T2 –  part-time non-flexible, T3  -
full-time flexible, and T4 – part-time flexible.
In order to mimic a typical recruitment process, in step 4 another email – inquiring 
about motivation and additional information – was sent to job seekers who explicitly 
signaled an interest in the position and to those who did not click on the link (i.e., 438+86 
= 524 applicants). Only the 11 job seekers who were not interested in the position after 
the first email did not receive the second o ne. A  total of 384 individuals responded to 
the second e-mail.
These 384 individuals were retained in step 5 of the application process, in which job 
offers were randomly sent out, again according to a stratified random sampling scheme. 
The initial aim was to hire 52 individuals – 13 in each type of contract. However, for 
reasons explained in Section 2.4, we did not attain this goal. Each applicant who did 
not accept the job offer in a particular treatment condition was replaced by another one 
randomly drawn from the same stratification cell. In the end, 79 job offers were sent out,
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of which only 38 were accepted. Another four individuals never showed up or resigned
before completing the contractual period.
Table 2 shows the distribution of offers and hired individuals across contract types.
It shows that the standard schedule (i.e., full time, no flex) had a higher acceptance rate
than the other options. The next section provides descriptive statistics for the 535 appli-
cants who were randomly assigned to the four contract types in step 1 of the application
process, and the 34 who were hired and completed the experiment. While the contracts
lasted for 3 weeks, we focus only on the first 2 weeks because in the last week the work-
ers were assigned a new task. This task was more complex and thus not comparable
with the one performed during the first 2 weeks.18
Table 1. Samples at Each Stage of the Experiment
Sample Experimental stages N
0 Applicants who started the online survey 686
1 First randomisation: assignment of contract types
Applicants who finished the survey and tests, & received 1st email with the
contract type
535
2 Applicants who stated interest after 1st email containing the contract type 438
3 Applicants who stated interest after 2nd email asking for new open questions 384
4 Second randomisation: who gets an offer among each contract type
Applicants who received an offer 79
Applicants who received an offer and accepted it, and were hired 38
Applicants who took the job and finished it 34
Table 2. Job Offers and Acceptance Rate
Offers Acceptance
Rate (%)
Workers (%)
T1: Full-time non-flex 17 70.6 11 32.35
T2: Part-time non-flex 19 42.1 7 20.59
T3: Full-time flex 23 40.5 9 26.47
T4: Part-time flex 20 40 7 20.59
Total 79 100 34 100
18They were asked to digitize words from the census and not figures. T he c omplexity r elates t o the 
quality of the pictures, which were more blurry, and therefore more difficult to type.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics of applicants and hired workers
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics across treatment groups of the avail-
able explanatory variables for both the sample of applicants who took the productivity
test and the hired workers who completed the experiment. We also check the extent to
which the treatment groups are balanced within these samples. As the applicants are
randomly assigned to the different treatments, this is a validity check of the random-
ization. Yet since each contract type will attract different types of workers, and as the
eventual hiring of workers is the outcome of this self-selection process, it is not surpris-
ing that the treatment groups are not balanced across the sample of hired workers.
We use the standardized difference (SD) to evaluate whether the samples are bal-
anced across treatment groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The advantage of the SD
is that it is not sensitive to sample size. This is particularly convenient in our context,
because the sample of hired workers is so small that conventional t-tests are not appro-
priate. We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin by considering an SD exceeding 0.20 to be
large.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Observables by Treatment Groups: Sample of Appli-
cants
(T1) (T2) (T3) (T4) Standardized
Full time Part time Full time Part time difference
non-flexible non-flexible flexible flexible
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(1)
Stratification Variables
Female 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.65 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08
High Productivity 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.23 -0.12 -0.10 0.00
Dependents 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.19 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12
Other Control Variables
Age Groups
20- 25 yrs old 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.50 -0.06 -0.09 0.07
26- 30 yrs old 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.14
31 yrs old and more 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.27 -0.06 -0.09 -0.19
Educational Levels
High School or less 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.05 0.12 -0.06
University 0.31 0.29 0.23 0.27 -0.04 -0.18 -0.09
Vocational 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.50 -0.01 0.05 0.13
N 140 132 150 113
Notes: The first four columns of the Table present the mean value of the covariates in the corre-
sponding treatment groups. The last three columns report the standardized differences defined as
(X̄j − X̄T1)/
√[(
Var(Xj) + Var(XT1)
)
/2
]
, where X̄j and Var(Xj) are the sample mean and the variance
of Xj for j ∈ {T2, T3, T4}.
4.2.1 The sample of applicants
In Table 3 we describe the sample of applicants. In the first four columns we report 
the means (and the associated SDs in parentheses) of the explanatory variables of the 
corresponding treatment groups. The last three columns report the SDs for treatments 
T2–T4 relative to treatment T1.
The profession of data clerk is a routine job that typically requires a medium level 
of education, as some familiarity with information and communication technologies is 
required. We indeed find t hat n early h alf o f t he a pplicants h ave a  v ocational degree, 
which in Colombia is a technical education. Students who complete this level of edu-
cation receive a diploma that is valued more than a high school degree, but less than a 
university degree. The temporary nature of the job explains why nearly half of the appli-
cants are younger than 26 and about two-thirds are women (Castellani et al. 2020). We
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also observe that 20 percent declared having dependents in the household, i.e. persons
in need of care, and the same proportion were high-productivity types as measured by
the pre-tests. As expected, these variables are balanced across treatment groups.19 We
only find an SD that exceeds 0.20 for the age group 26–30 when comparing T3 (full-time
flexible) with the reference treatment T1: the share of applicants in T3 is 9 percentage
points higher than the corresponding share in T1 (25 percent versus 16 percent). This
difference is not a big concern: we will see in Section 6.4 that our findings are robust to
control variables.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Observables by Treatment Groups: Sample of Workers
(T1) (T2) (T3) (T4) Standardized
Full time Part time Full time Part time difference
non-flexible non-flexible flexible flexible
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(1)
Stratification Variables
Female 0.64 0.86 0.44 0.57 0.48 -0.38 -0.13
High Productivity 0.27 0.14 0.22 0.14 -0.30 -0.11 -0.30
Dependents 0.27 0.14 0.11 0.43 -0.30 -0.39 0.32
Other Control Variables
Age Groups
20- 25 yrs old 0.27 0.14 0.22 0.43 -0.30 -0.11 0.32
26 - 30 yrs old 0.36 0.43 0.11 0.43 0.13 -0.57 0.13
31 yrs old and more 0.36 0.43 0.67 0.14 0.13 0.59 -0.48
Educational Level
High School or less 0.27 0.43 0.22 0.14 0.32 -0.11 -0.30
University 0.45 0.43 0.22 0.14 -0.05 -0.47 -0.64
Vocational 0.27 0.14 0.56 0.71 -0.30 0.56 0.86
N 11 7 9 7
Notes: The first four columns of the Table present the mean value of the covariates in the corre-
sponding treatment groups. The last three columns report the standardized differences defined as
(X̄j − X̄T1)/
√[(
Var(Xj) + Var(XT1)
)
/2
]
, where X̄j and Var(Xj) are the sample mean and the variance
of Xj for j ∈ {T2, T3, T4}.
4.2.2 The sample of hired workers
Table 4 describes the sample of hired workers. As expected, the variables are now 
imbalanced between the treatment groups, as the majority of the SDs are larger than
19It is noteworthy that the number of individuals assigned to the different treatments is not completely 
balanced. This is because we realized only after the random assignment that some individuals we re-
tained only completed part of the productivity test; we dropped these individuals from the analysis. As 
demonstrated in the table, this did not result in any major selectivity in the sample.
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0.20. This does not necessarily imply that these imbalances are reflected i n different 
productivity levels. In the analysis below, we will extract the sorting that is related to 
productivity by controlling for an ex ante measure of productivity that we derive from the 
test implemented in the second step of our experimental design (see Section 3.1 above). 
As we will explain in more detail in Section 4.3, this ex ante productivity measure is cho-
sen to match as closely as possible the definition of ex post on-the-job productivity that 
we use in the analysis to evaluate the productivity differences generated by the different 
contractual arrangements. Note that this ex ante productivity measure differs from the 
one used to construct the stratification variable “high productivity," since we wanted to 
match as closely as possible the measures of ex ante andex post productivity. Recall that 
the productivity tests performed during the application process did not record the time 
taken to perform the tests. This may partly explain why in Table 4 the differences be-
tween treatment groups in the fraction classed as “highly productive" do not fully reflect 
the differences that the ex ante productivity measure captures in the analysis reported 
below.
We expected a priori that flexible work arrangements would especially attract women 
and individuals with caring responsibilities. We indeed observe that the most flexible 
contract (T4) attracted the highest share of individuals with dependents: 0.43 is more 
than twice as high as the average share in the sample. However, this flexible arrange-
ment does not contain the highest share of women hired. The share of women is highest 
in the part-time non-flexible a rrangement ( T2), w hich c ontains a  b elow-average share 
with dependents. Finally, the full-time flexible a rrangement ( T3) s eems t o a ttract rela-
tively more women and individuals without caring responsibilities than the other types 
of contracts. We do not have a clear explanation for these deviations from our expec-
tations. It might be related to the small sample size. We do not describe the sorting 
patterns across the treatments for the other explanatory variables, because we do not 
have particular a priori hypotheses regarding their direction.
4.3 The outcome variables and their decomposition
Our main aim is to determine the impact of working-time flexibility on labor produc-
tivity. We first d iscuss h ow we m easure t he ex p ost p roductivity o f h ired workers and 
how we break this measure down into different components. This decomposition allows 
us to explore the mechanisms of potential productivity differences. Next, we define a
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measure of ex ante productivity and its decomposition. In the analysis reported in Sec-
tions 5 and 6, this ex ante measure is used to disentangle the selection from the ex post
motivational effects.
4.3.1 Ex post productivity
Different measures of productivity could be considered. In a private sector environ-
ment, a natural measure of productivity would be the value of production per unit of
contractual working time. In the current context, the value of production is not known,
but since the data entries served as an input for research purposes it is natural to value
accuracy. The need to type accurately was also stressed when instructions were pro-
vided on the first working day. We therefore code each correctly typed character as 1
and each incorrectly typed character as 0. This results in the following definition of the
productivity level of worker i in time period t:
APit,0 ≡ Cit/Tit (2)
where Cit is the number of correct characters that individual i typed within the con-
tractual time Tit of period t. In the analysis below we consider that t ∈ {1, 2} for both
working weeks included in the analysis. For a full-time worker Tit = 40 hours, while for
a part-time worker Tit = 20 hours.
This measure of productivity requires us to determine what is correct and incorrect.
We determined a correctly typed character to be equal to the mode of all typed characters
for each corresponding character image.20 Based on a 1 percent sub-sample in which
optical character recognition software was used, a 99 percent correspondence was found
with our measure of correctness based on the mode.
To explore the mechanisms that generate differences in productivity between types
of contracts, we define our productivity measure as follows:
APit,0 ≡ Cit/Tit = (Cit/Nit)× (Nit/Dit)× (Dit/Tit) ≡
3
∏
j=1
APit,j (3)
where Nit is the total number of characters typed within the contractual time Tit and Dit
20In a sensitivity analysis we used the median instead of the mode, but this did not change our findings 
in any way. This analysis is available from the authors upon request.
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is the actual working time. The actual working time differs from the contractual working
time in that workers do not work all the time. They can take breaks while remaining
in the lab (i.e., coffee break, going to the bathroom, or just a period in which they do
not type). Alternatively, they can leave the lab, which we label absenteeism. The actual
working time is determined by discarding these periods of interruption (breaks plus
absenteeism) from the contractual time. We cannot directly observe these interruptions
in working time, but the software registered each moment when a character was typed.
In the benchmark analysis we defined a period of interruption as any period that lasted
for more than 15 seconds between two subsequent instants when characters are typed.
The above equation breaks down average productivity (APit,0) into a measure of pre-
cision (Cit/Nit), i.e. the fraction of correctly typed images, a measure of speed (Nit/Dit),
i.e. the number of images typed per unit of actual working time, and a measure of ac-
tual working time (Dit/Tit), i.e. the fraction of contracted time that the worker actually
worked.
Work interruptions can be further decomposed into breaks and absenteeism. How-
ever, this decomposition is additive, so it cannot be integrated into the multiplicative
decomposition above. We therefore consider a separate additive decomposition in which
we use the sum of fractions relative to contractual time (Tit), actual working time (Dit),
breaks (Bit), and periods of absenteeism (Ait) is equal to 1:
Dit/Tit + Bit/Tit + Ait/Tit = 1 (4)
4.3.2 Ex ante productivity
The measures defined in the previous subsection relate to ex post productivity, which
was measured after the worker was hired. In Section 5 we evaluate whether flexible
contract environments attract more productive workers, and in Section 6 we try to dis-
entangle sorting from ex post motivational effects. To test this hypothesis, we use the
answers from the productivity test the applicants took during the first step of the appli-
cation process to construct the following average ex ante productivity measure:
APAi,0 = C
A
i /D
A
i (5)
where the superscript A denotes that the figures r efer t o t he e x a nte p roductivity test, 
Ci
A is the number of correct characters that applicant i typed in all three tasks of the
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productivity test, and DAi is the actual time that elapsed between typing the first and last
characters in the test. We denote this time by D rather than T, because it is conceptually
closer to Dit in the aforementioned decomposition formula of ex post productivity.
As for the ex post productivity measure, we can also decompose the ex ante measure.
However, since we cannot measure the contractual time T ex ante, we break it down into
two terms instead of three:
APAi,0 ≡ CAi /DAi =
(
CAi /N
A
i
)
×
(
NAi /D
A
i
)
≡ APAi,1 × APAi,2 (6)
where NAi is the total number of characters typed in the productivity test. This decom-
poses the total ex ante productivity into a measure of precision and speed.
5 Ex ante productivity and sorting into flexible jobs
5.1 Empirical strategy
One of the aims of this study is to determine the extent to which working flexibility
can enhance productivity by attracting more productive workers. In order to test this
we estimate the following model for j ∈ {0, 1, 2} (i.e. for the three ex ante productivity
measures defined above):
ln[APAi,j ] = λ +
4
∑
k=2
αkTk + ηAccepti +
4
∑
k=2
δkTk ∗ Accepti + X′i β + εi (7)
Tk denotes the contract type k to which individual i was randomly assigned; T2 is a 
dummy coded 1 if individual i was assigned to a part-time non-flexible schedule, T 3 to 
a full-time flexible s chedule, a nd T 4 to a  part-time flexible sc hedule. T1  denotes a full-
time non-flexible contract ( reference c ontract). A ccepti equals 1  i f individual i  received 
a job offer and accepted it, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients o f i nterest a re t hus αk 
for k ∈ {2, 3, 4} associated with the interaction terms. Whenever these coefficients are 
significantly d ifferent f rom z ero t hey s ignal a  d ifferential a cceptance r ate o f contract 
types k ∈ {2, 3, 4} relative to contract type 1, i.e. relative to the full-time non-flexible 
contract. Xi denotes the set of seven stratification variables. To enhance precision, the
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other explanatory variables reported in Table 3 such as educational level and age.21 
Finally, εi denotes the zero-mean error of the regression.
5.2 Results
Table 5 reports the main estimation results for testing whether more productive work-
ers sort into more flexible j obs. C olumn ( 1) r eveals t hat j ob a pplicants w ho s ort into 
full-time flexible contracts are nearly 50 percent (exp(.39) = 1.48) more productive than 
those who eventually accept a full-time non-flexible c ontract. This effect is significant at 
the 5 percent level. The point estimate of α2 is close to zero and far from statistical sig-
nificance, s uggesting t hat a  p art-time c ontract w ithout t ime-scheduling fl exibility does 
not attract more productive workers than the benchmark contract. By contrast, the point 
estimate for α4 is close to that of α3, which suggests that contracts with time-scheduling 
flexibility a ttract m ore p roductive workers b ut t he c oefficient is  im precisely estimated. 
We therefore find fi rm ev idence of  a po sitive so rting ef fect on ly fo r fu ll-time flexible 
contracts.
The decomposition analysis depicted in Columns (2) and (3) suggests that precision 
and speed contribute roughly equally to the effect of full-time flexible contracts, but the 
large standard errors of these estimates do not allow us to make a strong conclusion.
21This specification implicitly assumes that the treatment effect is constant across strata (see e.g., Imbens 
and Rubin, 2015, Section 9.6)
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Table 5. Test of Sorting into Flexible Jobs along Ex Ante Productivity
Ex ante Productivity measures (ln) Productivity Precision Speed
# Correct/ #Correct / # Questions /
Time Questions # Time
(1) (2) (3)
T2 : Part time non-flexible –.01 –.03 .01
(.07) (.04) (.06)
T3 : Full time flexible –.02 –.05 .03
(.07) (.04) (.06)
T4 : Part time flexible .05 .01 .04
(.07) (.04) (.06)
Accept –.21 –.12
(.15) (.10)
T2 × Accept .00 –.11 .11
(.41) (.31) (.16)
T3 × Accept .39** .20 .20
(.20) (.12) (.17)
T4 × Accept .36 .07 .29
(.23) (.12) (.22)
Constant –2.61*** –.26*** –2.36***
(.07) (.04) (.06)
R Squared .16 .051 .16
N 535 535 535
Notes: This Table presents the coefficients from regressing the ex-ante measures of productiv-
ity on treatment dummies interacted with a dummy of acceptance of the job offer. Column
(1) uses total measure of productivity, Column (2) uses a measure for Precision and Column
(3) uses a measure for Speed. Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. We add
stratification dummies as controls in all the specifications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 10 in the Appendix the full estimation results are reported including the estimated
coefficients of the control variables.
6 Ex post productivity and working-time flexibility
6.1 Empirical strategy
In this section we analyze how different flexible working arrangements affect on-the-
job productivity. We recorded information about the same data entry task during two 
of the three contracted weeks using the different measures of productivity described in 
Section 3.3. In a first step we use the logarithm of the benchmark average productivity
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measure as the outcome of interest, i.e. ln(APit,0) ≡ ln (Cit/Tit) . In subsequent steps
we take into account the decomposition in equation (3), which becomes additive after
the logarithm is taken, and the decomposition in equation (4), for which no logarithms
can be considered, as it is already additive. In each of those analyses, we consider both
the case with and without controlling for measures of ex ante productivity. When we
perform the analysis without controlling for ex ante productivity, we measure the overall
impact of contract flexibility on the chosen ex post productivity measures, combining the
selection effect and the behavioral effects. By controlling for the ex ante productivity
measures, we seek to estimate the behavioral impact of contract flexibility. We jointly
control for two measures of ex ante productivity: the logarithm of the overall ex ante
productivity measure (APAi,0 ≡ CAi /DAi ) and the logarithm of the component measuring
precision (APAi,1 ≡ CAi /DAi ).22
The benchmark regression without controlling for ex ante productivity can be written
as follows:
ln(Yit) = β1 + β2T2 + β3T3 + β4T4 + δSi + λ2 It2 + εit (8)
for t ∈ {1, 2} where Yit denotes one of the considered measures of productivity for 
individual i in week t, It2 = 1 if t = 2 and It2 = 0 if t = 1, so that λ2 accounts for the 
differential productivity in week 2 relative to week 1, the reference. Tj for j ∈ {1, ..., 4} 
and Si are, respectively, indicators of the contract type and sampling strata, and εit 
denotes the zero-mean error of the regression.
Estimating regression equation (8) entails two important challenges with respect to 
the inference of the parameters of interest. First, given the small sample size, we cannot 
rely on the standard asymptotic inference to test our hypotheses. We therefore use 
Fisher’s exact inference to obtain the P-values of the considered null hypotheses (Imbens 
and Rubin, 2015). A second potential problem of inference is that we must take into 
account the fact that productivity is correlated between the two weekly observations for 
each individual in the sample. A standard solution to this problem is to cluster the 
standard errors by individual. However, if there are only a small number of clusters, 
as is the case here, the standard errors are at risk of being biased downwards (Cameron 
and Miller, 2015). By relying on Fisher’s exact inference, we can resolve this issue as well 
(Heß, 2017). Below we report the standard asymptotic standard errors for all coefficients,
22The logarithm of the measure of speed is, according to equation (6), linearly dependent on the two 
other measures, and is therefore redundant as an additional control variable.
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and the exact p-values for only the coefficients of i nterest. The reported significance of 
coefficients will be based on the latter, if available.
6.2 Main results
Table 6 reports the estimated effects of the different forms of contract flexibility in 
the benchmark model, equation (8). Column (1) corresponds to the baseline regres-
sion including only the stratification variables a nd t he week fi xed ef fects. In  th e other 
specifications, we a ugment t he b aseline r egression w ith t he m easures f rom t he e x ante 
productivity test conducted in the selection phase.
Considering the estimated parameters of interest in column (1), we find t hat only 
the full-time flexible contract has a  s ignificant effect (exact P-value of  6 percent) on  the 
benchmark productivity measure. Workers hired with this contract are nearly 50 percent 
(exp(.40) = 1.49) more productive than full-time non-flexible w orkers. F or part-time 
workers under both flexible a nd non-flexible sc hedules, th e effects on  productivity are 
both positive, as expected, but these effects are not statistically different from that of 
full-time non-flexible workers.
The effects encompass both the behavioral and the selection effect of contract sched-
ule flexibility. When controlling for selection effects, we find that there remains a role for 
a behavioral effect. According to the point estimate, productivity still increases relative 
to a full-time non-flexible contract by 33 percent (exp(.28) =  1 .32). This effect is signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that the behavioral effect represents about 60 
percent of the total effect and the selection effect about 40 percent.
The effects of a part-time flexible a nd n on-flexible co ntract ar e bo th po sitive, but 
much smaller and not significantly different from z ero. We therefore conclude that there 
is no evidence that the flexibility o f p art-time work e nhances p roductivity, even i f i t is 
combined with a flexible working schedule.
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Table 6. Treatment Effects on Ex-Post Productivity
Productivity (ln) (1) (2)
T2: Part time non-
flexible
.12 .18
(.27) (.18)
[.66] [.37]
T3: Full time flexible .40* .28*
(.15) (.16)
[.06] [.10]
T4: Part time flexible .15 .09
(.22) (.23)
[.17] [.43]
Ref: T1 Full-time non-flexible
Constant –1.73*** –1.64***
(.11) (.49)
R Squared .2 .52
N 68 68
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients of estimating the treatment effect on the log of
total productivity , measured as the number of correct digits over the contracted time –
two weeks for individual level regressions, one week for week level regressions. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value for the
Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact p-value is the proportion of possible treatment as-
signments that yield a test statistic greater than or equal to the observed test statistics.
We used 3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to sig-
nificance levels according to Fisher p-values for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of
coefficients, stars reflect the p-values of the standard asymptotic inference. Stratification
dummies are included in all columns. Column (2) controls for the log of ex-ante pro-
ductivity - Precision (number of corrects answers over total questions) and for the log of
ex-ante total productivity (number of correct answers over total time spent to answer the
questions). In Table 12 in the Appendix the full estimation results are reported including
the estimated coefficients of the control variables.
6.3 Exploring mechanisms
We explore the mechanisms of the working arrangements on productivity by break-
ing down the benchmark productivity measure into its components. First, we consider 
the logarithmic additive form of the decomposition displayed by equation (3). Next, we 
consider the additive decomposition displayed in equation (4).
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6.3.1 Decomposing the effects on global productivity
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7 present the estimates of the first decomposition of the
global effects on productivity, which comprise both the sorting effects generated by the
application process and the behavioral on-the-job effects. In columns (5) to (8) the same
decomposition is displayed after controlling for the ex ante productivity or sorting ef-
fects. Columns (1) and (5) – denoted by "Total" – restate the total effect on productivity
reported in Table 6. The subsequent columns present the coefficients of the decomposi-
tion.
Table 7. Decomposition of the Total Effects on Ex-Post Productivity
Global- Productivity Without Sorting Effects
Total Precision Speed Effective
Time
Total Precision Speed Effective
Time
(C/T) (C/N) (N/D) (D/T) (C/T) (C/N) (N/D) (D/T)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
T2: Part-time .12 –.08 .00 .20 .18 –.07 –.00 .26*
non flexible (.27) (.10) (.14) (.12) (.18) (.05) (.10) (.13)
[.66] [.52] [.98] [.13] [.37] [.16] [.98] [.10]
T3: Full-time .40* .04 .14 .22** .28* –.01 .04 .25**
flexible (.15) (.02) (.08) (.12) (.16) (.04) (.10) (.11)
[.06] [.63] [.23] [.05] [.09] [.85] [.66] [.04]
T4: Part-time .15 .03 .12 .00 .09 –.01 .03 .07
flexible (.22) (.02) (.11) (.17) (.23) (.04) (.13) (.13)
[.17] [.38] [.12] [1.00] [.43] [.71] [.43] [.62]
Ref: T1 Full-time non-flexible
Constant –1.73*** –.06*** –.80*** –.87*** –1.64*** .09 –.25 –1.48***
(.11) (.02) (.05) (.08) (.49) (.10) (.33) (.37)
R Squared .2 .17 .29 .22 .52 .64 .54 .35
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Notes: This table presents the treatment effects on four outcome variables. Columns (1) and (5) corresponds to the log of Total
productivity, measured as the number of correct digits over the contracted time. Precision, columns (2) and (6), is the log of the
number of correct digits over the total digits typed. Speed, columns (3) and (7), is the log of the number of total digits over
working time. Finally, effective time, columns (4) and (8), is the log of working time over contracted time. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value for the Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact p-value is the
proportion of possible treatment assignments that yield a test statistic greater than or equal to the observed test statistics. We
used 3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to significance levels according to Fisher p-values
for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of coefficients, stars reflect the p-values of the standard asymptotic inference.
Stratification dummies are included in all columns. Columns 5 to 8 control for the log of ex-ante productivity - Precision and for
the log of ex-ante total productivity. Table 13 in the Appendix the full estimation results are reported including the estimated
coefficients of the control variables.
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We first focus on the findings for the workers on  a full-time flexible contract, as we 
only find a  s ignificantly hi gher pr oductivity fo r th is co ntract ty pe re lative to  full-time 
non-flexible c ontracts. T he b reakdown s uggests t hat t he b ehavioral c omponent, which 
represents about 60 percent of the total effect on productivity, is completely explained 
by more effective time use in the workplace. This follows from the fact that when sorting 
effects are controlled for, the estimated coefficient explaining the effect on effective time 
use (0.25) is nearly as large as the one explaining the total productivity effect (0.28), while 
the coefficients that measure the reaction due to precision and speed are close to zero and 
not statistically significant. B y c ontrast, t he s election p rocess s eemed t o h ave attracted 
workers who have the ability to type both faster and more precisely, as the coefficients 
associated with these components are larger for speed (0.14 > 0.04) or statistically dif-
ferent from zero for precision (0.04) only when sorting is not controlled for. However, 
based on the findings, i t i s d ifficult to  di sentangle wh ether pr ecision or  sp eed matters 
the most, because the coefficient related to precision is statistically significant, but small, 
while the coefficient related to speed is large, but statistically insignificant.
Another interesting result is that workers on part-time non-flexible s chedules also 
seem to demonstrate a more effective use of time than those in the comparison group 
(columns (4) and (8)), despite no observed differences in total productivity (columns 
(1) and (5)), and potentially at the loss of precision, though this loss is not significant 
(columns (2) and (6)). These effects should be interpreted as behavioral effects rather 
than sorting effects, as the corresponding coefficients are of similar magnitude regardless 
of whether sorting effects are controlled for or not.
The results from these specifications therefore provide evidence that working in more 
flexible environments makes individuals work more effectively, reducing their shirking 
time at work. The productivity of workers on full-time flexible contracts is also driven by 
the application process, which sorts workers who type more precisely per unit of time, 
but the analysis does not clearly indicate whether speed or precision dominates in this 
sorting process.
Our finding that the motivational effects of working-time schedules are largely driven 
by an increased number of working hours is in line with the findings o f B eckmann et 
al. (2017), who uses the German Socio-Economic Panel. However, our results seem to 
contradict those of Dutcher (2012), who reports that workplace flexibility h as negative 
effects on productivity for a similar “dull” data entry task as the one in our study. A 
potential explanation is that workplace flexibility implies not only working-time flexi-
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bility, but also that the work is not monitored. For routine tasks, monitoring may be an
essential device to keep workers committed to their work, as intrinsic motivation may be
lacking (Beckmann et al., 2017). Yet workers may still want to reciprocate the provided
working-time autonomy by increasing their effort (Ibid.; Kelliher and Anderson (2010)).
Another reason why our results may differ from those of Dutcher (2012) is that we hired
real workers instead of students.
Our findings suggest that part-time workers on non-flexible contracts also reciprocate
by working more, but this is partly counterbalanced by a lack of precision. The latter is
consistent with both the hypothesis that part-time workers are less effective than their
full-time counterparts because entering data typically involves making more mistakes at
the start (i.e. higher fixed start-up costs), and that part-time contracts attract less com-
mitted workers, a sorting effect for which we cannot control using our ex ante measure of
productivity (Künn-Nelen et al. (2013); Garnero (2016)). However, this does not explain
why we do not find similar or stronger positive effects on effective working time for
workers on flexible part-time contracts. The decomposition of the effect on working time
discussed in the next subsection provides more insights into this puzzle.
6.3.2 Decomposing the effects on time use
Table 8 presents the mean differences of the various uses of time across treatments
for the global measure of productivity (columns (1) to (3)) and for ex post productivity
after controlling for the sorting effect (columns (4) to (6)). We estimate each component
from equation 8 in order to evaluate which mechanism makes workers more productive
at work, as a percentage of total contracted time. The additive decomposition allows us
to disentangle the global effect of productivity on effective time D/T (worked time as
a percentage of contracted time), absenteeism as a percentage of contracted time A/T,
and time taken for breaks as a percentage of contracted time B/T.
We observe that selection effects play no role, as the effects on ex post productivity
are not affected when we control for ex ante productivity. This is in line with our expec-
tations, because working time refers to a behavioral rather than a selection effect. The
results also show that the positive productivity effects reported in the previous section
are induced by the fact that workers with flexible work contracts take fewer breaks rather
than being less absent.23
23Recall that the effects are now measured as percentage-point effects relative to the contractual time,
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A new result is that part-time workers with flexible contracts (T4) are found to reduce 
their break times by as much as 14 percentage points of the contractual working time, 
a reduction that is similar to that of part-time workers on non-flexible c ontracts (T2), 
and nearly twice as large as the effect for full-time workers on flexible c ontracts (T3). 
These findings suggest that part-time contracts do have motivational effects, but they do 
not translate into higher global productivity for various reasons. For part-time workers 
on non-flexible contracts, this positive effect was tempered by the lower precision with 
which they enter data. For those on flexible c ontracts, t his p ositive e ffect i s largely 
absorbed by higher rates of absenteeism. A potential explanation is that workers with 
more caring responsibilities sort much more into these kinds of contracts than in other 
ones (see Section 4.2.2). As the timing of care is very uncertain, they may be forced to be 
absent more than other workers.
6.4 Robustness checks
We conduct two main robustness tests on our main results: one for the inclusion of 
additional controls and another for the presence of outliers. In the model that tests for 
sorting by ex ante productivity (Table 5), we control for the stratification variables and for 
the additional control variables that were reported in Table 3. In Appendix Table 10 we 
report the results if these additional controls are not included in the regression; the point 
estimates and standard errors are hardly affected. This confirms that there need not be 
any concern that, conditional on the strata, the treatments in the sample of applicants is 
not balanced after the random assignment.
We did not perform the same sensitivity analysis for the sample of hired workers. 
The reason is that we do not expect this sample to be balanced across treatment condi-
tions, because we anticipate that different work arrangements have a different level of 
attractiveness for different applicants. To the extent that these differences are correlated 
with workers’ observed characteristics as well as with ex post productivity, introducing 
these characteristics as additional control variables in Equation (8) may therefore affect 
the results reported in Section 6.2 without invalidating them.
Second, we estimate a robust-to-outliers regression, which is a weighted least squares 
regression that weighs the observations differently based on absolute residuals (Verardi 
and Croux, 2009). Column (2) of Table 9 displays a somewhat smaller effect of full-
whereas in the previous sections proportional effects were measured on a logarithmic scale.
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Table 8. Decomposition of the Time Use Effects
Global Without Sorting Effects
Effective Absenteeism Breaks Effective Absenteeism Breaks
Time Time
(D/T) (A/T) (B/T) (D/T) (A/T) (B/T)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T2: Part time non-flexible .10 .04 –.14*** .12* .03 –.15***
(.06) (.04) (.04) (.06) (.04) (.04)
[.12] [.33] [.00] [.10] [.55] [.01]
T3: Full time flexible .09* –.01 –.08** .10* –.01 –.08**
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.03)
[.08] [.85] [.03] [.07] [.73] [.04]
T4: Part time flexible .02 .11 –.14*** .05 .10 –.14***
(.07) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.04)
[.60] [.33] [.00] [.18] [.44] [.00]
Ref: T1 Full time non-flexible
Constant .43*** .05* .51*** .22 .20** .58***
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.15) (.10) (.09)
R Squared .23 .26 .46 .35 .32 .48
N 68 68 68 68 68 68
Notes: This table presents the treatment effects on three outcome variables. Effective time, columns (1) and (4), corresponds
working time over contracted time. Absenteeism, columns (2) and (3), is the time outside the lab over the contracted time.
Finally, Breaks is measured as the non-working time inside the lab over the contracted time. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value for the Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact p-value is the proportion
of possible treatment assignments that yield a test statistic greater than or equal to the observed test statistics. We used
3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to significance levels according to Fisher p-values
for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of coefficients, stars reflect the p-values of the standard asymptotic inference.
Stratification dummies are included in all columns. Columns 4 to 6 control for the log of ex-ante productivity. In Table 14
in the Appendix the full estimation results are reported including the estimated coefficients of the control variables.
time flexible contracts on total productivity (exp(0.34) = 1.40), but the effect remains
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (Fisher exact p-value). When controlling for
sorting effects (column (4)), the coefficient is slightly reduced and the p-value increases
slightly from 10 percent to 12 percent.
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Table 9. Robustness Checks
Robustness
Global Without Sorting
Productivity (ln) (1) (2) (3) (4)
T2 Part-time no flexible .12 .29 .17 .18
(.27) (.15) (.19) (.15)
[.66] [.19] [.37] [.40]
T3 Full-time flexible .40** .34** .28* .28
(.15) (.14) (.16) (.15)
[.06] [.05] [.10] [.12]
T4 Part-time flexible .15 .08 .09 .07
(.22) (.15) (.23) (.16)
[.17] [.57] [.61] [.70]
Ref: T1 Full-time non-flexible
Ex ante productivity - Precision .89*** .90***
(.14) (.22)
Ex ante total productivity -0.08 –.06
(.21) (.15)
Constant –1.73*** –6.89 -1.64*** –6.50
(.11) (5.03) (.49) (4.85)
R Squared .2 .2 .52 . .48
N 68 68 68 68
Notes: the outcome variable is the log measure of productivity, measured as the number of correct digits over the contracted time. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value for the Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact p-value 
is the proportion of possible treatment assignments that yield a test statistic greater than or equal to the observed test statistics. In 
this case, we used 3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to significance levels according to Fisher 
p-values for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of c oefficients, stars reflect the  p-values of the  standard asymptotic inference. 
Strata variables are included in all columns.
7 Conclusion
We conducted a field experiment to test whether working-time flexibility affects the 
productivity of workers hired for a temporary routine job. A novelty of our study is that
we randomized job applicants rather than employees into different contractual environ-
ments, and tested the productivity of these job seekers at the start of the application 
process before assigning them into these different environments. This allowed us to 
decompose the total effect of working-time flexibility into sorting and behavioral effects.
We found that both part-time work and working-time flexibility substantially reduced
working time interruptions. However, for part-time workers this did not result in a sta-
tistically significant globally higher level of productivity, either because these workers
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also made more mistakes or because they were more absent from work. By contrast, for 
full-time workers who were given the autonomy to choose when to start and stop work-
ing, this resulted in more effective working time, which in turn significantly increased 
their productivity by as much as 30 percent. Furthermore, the working-time autonomy 
enhanced the attractiveness of the job for intrinsically more productive workers: their 
eventual productivity was estimated to be as much as 50 percent higher than that of 
workers hired on a non-flexible full-time contract.
The finding t hat w orking-time fl exibility ca n al so en hance pr oductivity in  routine 
jobs is new, and may provide valuable advice for human resource strategies. Neverthe-
less, our findings c annot b e g eneralized t o a ll t ypes o f j obs s ince o ur r esearch design 
considered a very particular job in which very specific routine tasks had to be executed. 
Future research could scale up the experiment and extend it to other (routine) tasks and 
working environments.
We identified sorting effects based on a  measure of intrinsic p roductivity. However, 
we have seen that sorting effects could be related to other intrinsic characteristics of ap-
plicants, such as commitment or caring responsibilities for dependents, which in turn 
may generate behavioral effects. These examples reveal that sorting and behavioral ef-
fects are often very much intertwined. Disentangling these effects may therefore often be 
a matter of interpretation. While this suggests promising avenues of research, we believe 
the decompositions of the kind that we proposed here can improve our understanding of 
why certain flexible working arrangements are effective (or not) at enhancing workers’ 
productivity.
32
References
Angelici, Marta and Paola Profeta, “Smart-Working: Work Flexibility without Con-
straints,” Technical Report 2020.
Beckmann, Michael, “Working-time autonomy as a management practice,” IZA World
of Labor, 2016.
, Thomas Cornelissen, and Matthias Kräkel, “Self-managed working time and em-
ployee effort: Theory and evidence,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017,
133, 285 – 302.
Bertrand, Marianne, “Coase lecture–the glass ceiling,” Economica, 2018, 85 (338), 205–
231.
Bloom, Nicholas, James Liang, John Roberts, and Zhichun Jenny Ying, “Does working
from home work? Evidence from a Chinese experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2015, 130 (1), 165–218.
BLS, “Job Flexibilities and Work Schedules Summary,” Technical Report, Bureau of La-
bor Statistics 2019.
Bustelo, Monserrat, Ana María Díaz Escobar, Jeanne Lafortune, Claudia Piras,
Luz Magdalena Salas Bahamón, José Tessada et al., “What is The Price of Freedom?:
Estimating Women’s Willingness to Pay for Job Schedule Flexibility,” Technical Report,
Inter-American Development Bank 2020.
Cameron, Colin and Douglas Miller, “A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Infer-
ence,” Journal of Human Resources, 2015, 50 (2), 317–372.
Castellani, Francesca, Giulia Lotti, and Nataly Obando, “Fixed or open-ended? Labor
contract and productivity in the Colombian manufacturing sector,” Journal of Applied
Economics, 2020, 23 (1), 199–223.
Chen, Kuan-Ming, Claire Ding, John A List, and Magne Mogstad, “Reservation Wages
and Workers’ Valuation of Job Flexibility: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment,”
Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.
Chen, M Keith, Peter E Rossi, Judith A Chevalier, and Emily Oehlsen, “The value of
flexible work: Evidence from uber drivers,” Journal of Political Economy, 2019, 127 (6),
2735–2794.
33
Devicienti, Francesco, Elena Grinza, and Davide Vannoni, “The impact of part-time
work on firm productivity: evidence from Italy,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 2018,
27 (2), 321–347.
Dutcher, E Glenn, “The effects of telecommuting on productivity: An experimental
examination. The role of dull and creative tasks,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Orga-
nization, 2012, 84 (1), 355–363.
Eaton, Susan C, “If you can use them: Flexibility policies, organizational commitment,
and perceived performance,” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2003,
42 (2), 145–167.
Eurofound, “Sixth European Working Conditions Survey. Luxembourg: Publications
Office of the European Union,” 2015.
Garnero, Andrea, “Are part-time workers less productive and underpaid?,” IZA World
of Labor, 2016.
, Stephan Kampelmann, and François Rycx, “Part-time work, wages, and productiv-
ity: evidence from Belgian matched panel data,” ILR Review, 2014, 67 (3), 926–954.
Goldin, Claudia, “A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter,” American Economic
Review, 2014, 104 (4), 1091–1119.
He, Haoran, David Neumark, and Qian Weng, “Do Workers Value Flexible Jobs? A
Field Experiment on Compensating Differentials,” Technical Report, Journal of Labor
Economics - forthcoming 2020.
Heß, Simon, “Randomization Inference with Stata: A Guide and Software,” The Stata
Journal, 2017, 17 (3), 630–651.
ILO, “Promoting employment and decent work in a changing landscape,” Technical
Report, ILO - forthcoming 2020.
Imbens, Guido W. and Donald B. Rubin, Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomed-
ical Sciences: An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Kelliher, Clare and Deirdre Anderson, “Doing more with less? Flexible working prac-
tices and the intensification of work,” Human relations, 2010, 63 (1), 83–106.
34
Künn-Nelen, Annemarie, Andries De Grip, and Didier Fouarge, “Is part-time employ-
ment beneficial for firm productivity?,” ILR Review, 2013, 66 (5), 1172–1191.
Mas, Alexandre and Amanda Pallais, “Valuing alternative work arrangements,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 2017, 107 (12), 3722–59.
OECD, Be Flexible, “Background brief on how workplace flexibility can help European
employees to balance work and family,” 2016.
Rosenbaum, Paul R and Donald B Rubin, “Constructing a control group using multi-
variate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score,” The Ameri-
can Statistician, 1985, 39 (1), 33–38.
Specchia, GL and Vincent Vandenberghe, “Is part-time employment a boon or bane for
firm productivity,” Unpublished Paper, Université de Louvain, 2013.
Verardi, Vincenzo and Christophe Croux, “Robust regression in Stata,” The Stata Journal,
2009, 9 (3), 439–453.
World-Bank, “World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends,” Technical Report,
World Bank 2016.
35
8 Appendix
8.1 Survey 1
Greetings Welcome, thank you for your interest in this position. We invite you to fill
your data in the following application form in order to be considered in the selection
process. At the end, you will do some digitizing exercises that won’t take you more than
10 minutes.
Source. How did you hear of the position?
1. Saw the announcement in OLX
2. Saw the announcement in Elempleo.com
3. Saw the announcement in Clasificados El Tiempo
4. Other, which?
Device. Which device are you filling the survey on?
1. Desktop computer
2. Laptop
3. Tablet
4. Cellphone
First Names. Names
Last Names. Last Names
E-mail. E-mail address (check that it is spelled correctly)
Number. Phone number
Date of birth. Date of birth
Gender. Gender
1. Male
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2. Female
Identity document. Identity document.
1. Colombian ID
2. Foreign ID
3. Passport
ID number. ID number (without any dots, commas or spaces)
Educational attainment. Educational attainment
1. None
2. Elementary
3. High school
4. Technical or technology degree
5. Undergraduate degree
6. Graduate degree
Marital status. Marital status
1. Married
2. Divorced
3. Single
4. Widow
5. Free union
Number of children. Number of children (if you have none, write “0”)
Pre-schoolers. Are you responsible for any child under the age of 5 years?
1. Yes
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2. No
If answer yes. How many children under the age of 5 live in your home?
Older people. Are you responsible for any adult over the age of 65?
1. Yes
2. No
Disabled people. Are there any disabled people living with you?
1. Yes
2. No
Previous experience. Do you have work experience?
1. Yes
2. No
If answer yes. How many years and months of work experience do you have?
1. Years
2. Months
Currently working. Are you currently working?
1. Yes
2. No
If Previous experience, References. Write the names of one professional reference,
if you have it
Reference contact. Write the name or phone number of your professional reference
Personal reference. Specify the name of one personal reference, if you have it.
Relationship. How are you related to your personal reference?
Personal reference contact. Write the phone number of your personal reference
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8.2 Pre-employment test
1. Task 1: Type the 14 numbers displayed on the left side column of a list displayed
on the screen, and write the number in the corresponding cell on the right side
column, as shown below.
Figure 2. Ex-ante productivity test 1
2. Task 2: Type the 8 words displayed on the left side column of a list on the screen,
and write the word in the corresponding cell on the right side column. The job
seekers were not able to see the words they typed and were not able to correct
mistakes. The figure below shows how this task is displayed online.
3. Task 3: the last test aimed at checking how focused a worker was by asking how
many times the letter “a” appears in the next sentence: “Había una vez una iguana
que se llamaba Mariana. Le gustaba comer moscas. Pasaba sus días y noches recorriendo
manglares y selvas.”
8.3 Email 1
Thank you for your interest in this position. We are sending this first r esponse to 
interested applicants like you. We are trying to solve all doubts you may have about the 
job. Please click in the following link where you will find detailed information about the 
position (payment, schedule and duration of the appointment) and you will be able to 
continue with the application process: Link
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Figure 3. Ex-ante productivity test 2
There were 4 versions of the previous link (one for each treatment condition): “Thank
you very much for your expression of interest. Below you can find more information
about the position:
1. The aim of the job is to support a research project at Javeriana University
2. The length of the appointment is 3 weeks (from November 26 to December 14)
3. The aim of the job is to support a research project at Javeriana University
4. The work schedule is (T1, T2a, T2b , T3, T4)
5. You would be hired under a contract for the provision of services, and the total
payment will be: (T1, T2a, T2b , T3, T4)
T1. “Monday to Friday, working hours: 8 AM – 5 PM” (Full time, non-flexible). 840.000
COP (approximately 280 USD at the time).
T2a. “Monday to Friday, working hours: 8 AM – 12 M” (Part time, non-flexible, morn-
ing). 420.000 COP (approximately 140 USD at the time).
T2b. “Monday to Friday, working hours: 1 PM – 5 PM” (Part time, non-flexible, after-
noon). 420.000 COP (approximately 140 USD at the time).
T3. “You must work 40 hours a week and you can agree the working hours with 
your supervisor, according to your availability. However, you may only work from
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8 AM – 8 PM time frame Monday to Friday” (Full time, flexible). 840.000 COP
(approximately 280 USD at the time).
T4. “You must work 20 hours a week and you can agree the working hours with your
supervisor, according to your availability. However, you may only work in the 8
AM – 8 PM time frame between Mondays and Fridays” (Part time, flexible). 420.000
COP (approximately 140 USD at the time).
After receiving the information, we asked them: “Are you interested in this posi-
tion?” Yes/No. If the applicant selected “No”, we asked him: “Why aren’t you inter-
ested?”
1. I got another job
2. The wage does not satisfy my expectations
3. The work schedule does not satisfy my expectations
4. Other
If he selected option 2 or 3, we asked them about their reservation wage and about
their ideal working hours. If he applicant selected “Yes”, the survey displayed the fol-
lowing message: "Thank you very much for completing this survey. We will contact the
selected candidates during the course of next week."
8.4 EMAIL 2
“Considering the volume of applications received and the difficulty of conducting an
interview to all job applicants, we would like to know more about you. Please answer
the questions in the following link in order to resume the application process:
• Are you still interested in the position? o Yes (1) o No (2)
• Tell us why you are interested in this job
• How do you manage your time in order to achieve a better work-life balance?
• What is the highest number of hours you would be available to work per week?
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• Why are you interested in working part time? (This question was only displayed
to applicants from the part-time treatment groups)
Thank you for filling this survey, we will send the selected candidates an email during
the course of next week. Please answer the previous survey as soon as possible. Best
regards.
8.5 EMAIL 3
Congratulations! After an exhaustive selection process, we want to inform you that
you have been selected for the position of Data Clerk for a study that is being carried out
by Javeriana University. Remember that the job characteristics are: Duration: 3 weeks
(From November 26 to December 14). Working Hours:
T1. “Monday to Friday, working hours: 8 AM – 5 PM” (Full time, non-flexible).
T2a. “Monday to Friday, working hours: 8 AM – 12 M” (Part time, non-flexible, morn-
ing).
T2b. “Monday to Friday, working hours: 1 PM – 5 PM” (Part time, non-flexible, after-
noon).
T3. “You must work 40 hours a week and you can agree the working hours with your
supervisor, according to your availability. However, you may only work from 8 AM
– 8 PM time frame Monday to Friday” (Full time, flexible).
T4. “You must work 20 hours a week and you can agree the working hours with your
supervisor, according to your needs. However, you may only work in the 8 AM –
8 PM time frame between Mondays and Fridays” (Part time, flexible).
Salary:
T1. 840.000 COP (approximately 280 USD at the time).
T2a. 420.000 COP (approximately 140 USD at the time).
T2b. 420.000 COP (approximately 140 USD at the time).
T3. 840.000 COP (approximately 280 USD at the time).
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T4. 420.000 COP (approximately 140 USD at the time).
According to the new regulations, you decide whether to present in advance the
corresponding social security payment of the value of this contract or, otherwise, you
must sign the affidavit (attached), in which you agree to pay your social security after
receiving the payment from Universidad Javeriana. No one is exempt from paying social
security and the University is not responsible for these payments.
If you are still interested, please respond immediately to this offer and bring the
following documents, no later than (THREE DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THE EMAIL)
1. Copy of the tax id.
2. Copy of the identification document.
3. Bank certification with date of issue no longer than 3 months.
4. Certificate of affiliation to health service.
5. Provider registration form completed (attached).
6. Declaration of information and contributions to the social security system (attached
format).
Please bring these documents to the following address: Carrera 7 # 40B-36 (Jorge
Hoyos Building, 7th floor). In case you cannot attend in person, please contact Carolina
Franco.
If you do not bring the documentation on the date indicated, we cannot keep the job
offer.
Regards,
Hiring Team
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8.6 Tables
Table 10. Test of sorting into flexible jobs along ex ante productivity
Ex ante Productivity measures (ln) Productivity Precision Speed
# Correct/ #Correct / # Questions /
Time Questions # Time
(1) (2) (3)
T2 : Part time non-flexible –.01 –.03 .01
(.07) (.04) (.06)
T3 : Full time flexible –.02 –.05 .03
(.07) (.04) (.06)
T4 : Part time flexible .05 .01 .04
(.07) (.04) (.06)
Accept –.21 –.08 –.12
(.15) (.10) (.10)
T2 × Accept .00 –.11 .11
(.41) (.31) (.16)
T3 × Accept .39** .20 .20
(.20) (.12) (.17)
T4 × Accept .36 .07 .29
(.23) (.12) (.22)
Educ: High School or less –.00 –.00 .00
(.06) (.03) (.05)
Educ: Vocational –.04 –.05 .01
(.06) (.03) (.04)
Age 20- 25 yr old .03 .02 .01
(.05) (.03) (.04)
Age 26 - 30 yr old .01 .01 .00
(.07) (.04) (.05)
Men/No dep/High prod .52*** .14*** .37***
(.07) (.05) (.06)
Men/Dep/Low prod –.08 –.03 –.05
(.12) (.06) (.13)
Men/Dep/High prod .52*** –.05 .57***
(.11) (.08) (.08)
Women/No dep/Low prod –.04 –.00 –.04
(.07) (.04) (.05)
Women/No dep/High prod .56*** .12*** .44***
(.07) (.04) (.05)
Women/Dep/Low prod .04 .03 .01
(.09) (.05) (.08)
Women/Dep/High prod .45*** .15*** .29***
(.07) (.04) (.06)
Constant –2.61*** –.26*** –2.36***
(.07) (.04) (.06)
R Squared .16 .051 .16
N 535 535 535
Notes: This Table presents the coefficients from regressing the ex-ante measures of productivity on treatment dummies interacted
with a dummy of acceptance to the job offer. Column (1) uses total measure of productivity, Column (2) uses a measure for
Precision and Column (3) uses a measure for Speed. Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. We add stratification
dummies as controls in all the specifications and additional 45trols such as age group and the level of education. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11. Test of sorting into Flexible Jobs along Ex Ante Productivity
Ex ante Productivity measures (ln) Productivity Precision Speed
# Correct/ #Correct / # Questions /
Time Questions # Time
(1) (2) (3)
Part time no Flex –.01 –.03 .02
(.07) (.04) (.06)
Full time flex –.02 –.05 .03
(.07) (.04) (.05)
Part time flex .05 .01 .04
(.07) (.04) (.06)
Accepted Job Offer=1 –.21 –.08 –.13
(.15) (.10) (.10)
Part time no Flex × Accepted Job
Offer=1
.01 –.10 .11
(.40) (.30) (.16)
Full time flex × Accepted Job Of-
fer=1
.38* .18 .20
(.20) (.12) (.17)
Part time flex × Accepted Job Of-
fer=1
.35 .05 .30
(.23) (.13) (.22)
Men/No dep/High prod .52*** .15*** .37***
(.07) (.05) (.06)
Men/Dep/Low prod –.09 –.04 –.05
(.13) (.06) (.13)
Men/Dep/High prod .51*** –.06 .57***
(.10) (.08) (.08)
Women/No dep/Low prod –.04 –.00 –.04
(.07) (.04) (.05)
Women/No dep/High prod .56*** .11*** .44***
(.07) (.04) (.05)
Women/Dep/Low prod .03 .03 .01
(.09) (.05) (.08)
Women/Dep/High prod .45*** .15*** .30***
(.07) (.04) (.06)
Constant –2.61*** –.27*** –2.35***
(.07) (.04) (.05)
R Squared .16 .043 .16
N 535 535 535
Notes: This Table presents the coefficients from regressing the ex-ante measures of productivity on treatment dummies interacted
with a dummy of acceptance to the job offer. Column (1) uses total measure of productivity, Column (2) uses a measure for
Precision and Column (3) uses a measure for Speed. Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. We add stratification
dummies as controls in all the specifications and additional controls such as age group and the level of education. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12. Treatment Effects on Ex-Post Productivity
Productivity (ln) (1) (2)
T2: Part time non-flexible .12 .18
(.27) (.18)
[.66] [.37]
T3: Full time flexible .40* .28*
(.15) (.16)
[.06] [.10]
T4: Part time flexible .15 .09
(.22) (.23)
[.17] [.43]
Ref: T1 Full time non-flexible
Ex ante productivity - Precision (ln) .89***
(.14)
Ex ante total productivity (ln) –.08
(.21)
Men/No dep/High prod –.11
(.17)
Men/Dep/Low prod .39*
(.19)
Women/No dep/Low prod .07
(.20)
Women/No dep/High prod –.04
(.14)
Women/Dep/Low prod .46*
(.25)
Women/Dep/High prod .07
(.15)
Constant –1.73*** –1.64***
(.11) (.49)
R Squared .2 .52
N 68 68
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients of estimating the treatment effect on the log of total productivity, measured as the num-
ber of correct digits over the contracted time – two weeks for individual level regressions, one week for week level regressions.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value for the Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact
p-value is the proportion of possible treatment assignments that yield a test statistic greater than or equal to the observed test
statistics. We used 3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to significance levels according to
Fisher p-values for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of coefficients, stars reflect the p-values of the standard asymptotic
inference. Stratification dummies are included in all columns. Column (2) also controls for the log of ex-ante productivity - Pre-
cision (number of corrects answers over total questions) and for the log of ex-ante total productivity (number of correct answers
over total time spent to answer the questions).
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Table 13. Decomposition of the Total Effect on Ex-Post Productivity
Global- Productivity Without Sorting Effects
Total Precision Speed Effective
Time
Total Precision Speed Effective
Time
(C/T) (C/N) (N/D) (D/T) (C/T) (C/N) (N/D) (D/T)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
T2: Part-time .12 –.08 .00 .20 .18 –.07 –.00 .26*
non flexible (.27) (.10) (.14) (.12) (.18) (.05) (.10) (.13)
[.66] [.52] [.98] [.13] [.37] [.16] [.98] [.10]
T3: Full-time .40* .04 .14 .22** .28* –.01 .04 .25**
flexible (.15) (.02) (.08) (.12) (.16) (.04) (.10) (.11)
[.06] [.63] [.23] [.05] [.09] [.85] [.66] [.04]
T4: Part-time .15 .03 .12 .00 .09 –.01 .03 .07
flexible (.22) (.02) (.11) (.17) (.23) (.04) (.13) (.13)
[.17] [.38] [.12] [1.00] [.43] [.71] [.43] [.62]
Ex ante productivity - Preci-
sion
.89*** .24** .15 .50**
(.26) (.09) (.19) (.20)
Ex ante total productivity (ln) –.08 .02 .18 –.29*
(.21) (.03) (.13) (.16)
Ref: T1 Full-time non-flexible
Men/No dep/High prod –.00 –.00 .05 –.05 –.13 –.05 –.04 –.03
(.14) (.02) (.09) (.11) (.23) (.04) (.14) (.09)
Men/Dep/Low prod .21 .00 –.07 .28 .18 .05 –.05 .40**
(.23) (.03) (.10) (.26) (.32) (.07) (.11) (.17)
Women/No dep/Low prod –.08 –.05 –.16 .12 .06 .02 –.06 .11
(.22) (.06) (.12) (.15) (.24) (.04) (.11) (.13)
Women/No dep/High prod .12 .03 .11 –.02 –.10 –.04 –.04 .04
(.19) (.04) (.09) (.16) (.24) (.04) (.10) (.14)
Women/Dep/Low prod .54 .05 .26 .23 .48 .02 .21 .22*
(.34) (.05) (.19) (.17) (.31) (.04) (.15) (.13)
Women/Dep/High prod .13 –.04 –.04 .21 .07 –.06 –.09 .22**
(.24) (.03) (.17) (.18) (.25) (.08) (.14) (.10)
Constant –1.73*** –.06*** –.80*** –.87*** –1.64*** .09 –.25 –1.48***
(.11) (.02) (.05) (.08) (.49) (.10) (.33) (.37)
R Squared .2 .17 .29 .22 .52 .64 .54 .35
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Notes: This table presents the treatment effects on four outcome variables. Columns (1) and (5), corresponds to the log of Total productivity ,
measured as the number of correct digits over the contracted time. Precision, columns (2) and (6), is the log of the number of correct digits over
the total digits typed. Speed, columns (3) and (7), is the log of the number of total digits over working time. Finally, effective time, columns
(4) and (8), is the log of working time over contracted time. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value
for the Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact p-value is the proportion of possible treatment assignments that yield a test statistic greater than
or equal to the observed test statistics. Ee used 3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to significance levels
according to Fisher p-values for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of coefficients, stars reflect the p-values of the standard asymptotic
inference. Columns 5 to 8 controls for ex-ante productivity - Precision and for the log of ex-ante total productivity. Stratification dummies are
included in all columns.
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Table 14. Decomposition of Time Use Effects
Global Without Sorting Effects
Effective Absenteeism Breaks Effective Absenteeism Breaks
Time Time
(D/T) (A/T) (B/T) (D/T) (A/T) (B/T)
T2: Part time non-flexible .10 .04 –.14*** .12* .03 –.15***
(.06) (.04) (.04) (.06) (.04) (.04)
[.12] [.33] [.00] [.10] [.55] [.01]
T3: Full time flexible .09* –.01 –.08** .10* –.01 –.08**
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.03)
[.08] [.85] [.03] [.07] [.73] [.04]
T4: Part time flexible .02 .11 –.14*** .05 .10 –.14***
(.07) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.04)
[.60] [.33] [.00] [.18] [.44] [.00]
Ex ante productivity - Preci-
sion (ln)
.20** –.12** –.08*
(.08) (.06) (.05)
Ex ante total productivity (ln) –.11 .07 .04
(.07) (.05) (.04)
Ref: T1 Full time non-flexible
Men/No dep/High prod –.04 –.01 .04 –.03 –.01 .04
(.04) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04)
Men/Dep/Low prod .12 .01 –.13*** .17* –.02 –.15***
(.12) (.08) (.04) (.08) (.06) (.03)
Women/No dep/Low prod .05 .04 –.09* .05 .04 –.09*
(.06) (.04) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.05)
Women/No dep/High prod –.03 .03 .00 –.01 .02 –.00
(.07) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Women/Dep/Low prod .09 .04 –.13* .08 .04 –.13*
(.08) (.04) (.07) (.07) (.03) (.07)
Women/Dep/High prod .07 .02 –.09** .07 .02 –.09**
(.07) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.03)
Constant .43*** .05* .51*** .22 .20** .58***
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.15) (.10) (.09)
R Squared .23 .26 .46 .35 .32 .48
N 68 68 68 68 68 68
Notes: This table presents the treatment effects on three outcome variables. Effective time, columns (1) and (4), corresponds
working time over contracted time. Absenteeism, columns (2) and (3), is the time outside the lab over the contracted time.
Finally, Breaks is measured as the non-working time inside the lab over the contracted time. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual level. Exact p-value for the Fisher Tests in brackets. This exact p-value is the proportion
of possible treatment assignments that yield a test statistic greater than or equal to the observed test statistics. We used
3000 permutations. Note that *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 correspond to significance levels according to Fisher p-values
for T2, T3, and T4 coefficients. For the rest of coefficients, stars reflect the p-values of the standard asymptotic inference.
Stratification dummies are included in all columns. Columns 4 to 6 control for ex-ante productivity.
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